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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that computer simulations can provide valuable insights into the performance of voting 
methods on different collective decision problems. This could improve institutional design, even when there is 
no general theoretical result to support the optimality of a voting method. 
To support our claim, we first describe a decision problem that has not received much theoretical 
attention in the literature. We outline different voting methods to address that collective decision problem. 
Under certain criteria of assessment akin to extensions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, we run simulations for 
the methods using MATLAB, in order to compare their performance under various conditions. We consider and 
respond to concerns about the use of simulations in the assessment of voting procedures for policymaking. 
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1 Introduction  
Not all collective decision problems are born 
equal. They vary according to the number of 
participants that must make the decision 
(ranging from a pair to a full nation); they also 
differ regarding what must be chosen (for 
instance, it may be an only option, a ranking, or 
even a grade over several options); there is also 
variation on the views that count to make a 
choice (only those of some or the views of all the 
participants) and on how much they count (for 
instance, some views may be weighted or all 
might be counted equally). Nowadays, there is 
no shortage of decision problems that involve 
the participation and acquiescence of very large 
groups, expecting to meet certain political 
ideals. Different procedures can be used to 
make a collective decision by means of a voting 
method. In order to fit the ideals of our 
democratic societies, voting methods should 
incorporate the views of every member of the 
group to yield collective outcomes, by means of a 
specific aggregation function. Aiming to achieve 
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certain goals, some of these methods can provide 
clear advantages over others, at least under 
certain conditions. Those goals may include 
procedural qualities such as inclusiveness, 
equality, and fairness; but they may also include 
instrumental qualities, such as reliability or welfare. 
In this paper we explore one crucial aspect 
in which the use of computer simulations can 
provide insights for social policymaking 
concerning voting methods. For some collective 
decision problems, under certain assessment 
criteria, there is an optimal method;1 but it is 
not necessarily the same for all choice 
situations. Hence, it would be in our best 
interest to have the means to select the best 
collective decision-making procedure, if there 
is one, for each situation. Astounding general 
results are known for some kinds of decision 
problems;2 theoretical results, however, are hard 
to come by. We argue that when no theoretical 
result is available computer simulations can 
provide useful guidance of the procedure’s 
performance on different choice situations. 
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According to the enterprise that Rohit Parikh 
labeled ‘social software’,3 this could be a 
remarkable advantage for institutional design. 
In order to support our claim, we first 
describe a general kind of choice situation that 
has not received much attention in the existing 
research literature. Next, we outline different 
procedures to aggregate individual opinions in 
order to produce a collective outcome. We then 
set criteria for the assessment of epistemic 
instrumental value, that is: ways to determine 
the ability of a voting method to track the 
correct outcome, assuming there is one. Using 
MATLAB, we run some insightful simulations 
to compare the performance of our voting 
methods under various conditions. We 
conclude by identifying some crucial concerns 
about the use of computer simulations in order 
to assess voting procedures for policymaking. 
 
2 Collective decision problems 
Problems concerning the assignment of 
economic or human resources, to be decided by 
a set of agents, are addressed in the literature on 
social choice.4 Therein, assignment mechanisms 
are designed to maximize, in a certain sense, a 
function of social choice; these mechanisms are 
defined over the set of preferences among the 
decision-makers. Preferences are private 
information of the agents that they manifest by 
means of a ballot. The ballot then allows to make 
a social choice through an aggregation function. 
The agents’ strategic behavior plays a fundamental 
role in problems concerning the assignment of 
goods. Social choice assignment mechanisms 
try to avoid incentives for individuals to falsify 
their true preferences. Thus, non-manipulable 
mechanisms are the most valued and looked for 
in committees of decision-makers.  
In this paper, we focus on the process of 
candidate choice selection by a set of agents 
(voters). In describing some methods that are 
common in the literature, we heavily rely on the 
hypothesis that voters are responding to the 
ballot sincerely, according to their true 
preferences, and not voting strategically. Even 
if many of the procedures we chose exhibit the 
property of non-manipulability, we always 
perform simulations based on the true 
preference of voters. The study of manipulability 
of voting systems has been the target of other 
theoretical5,6,7 and empirical8,9 avenues of research, 
some of them using simulations.10  Recent 
research has shown how, from a strategic 
approach, stochastic simulation can be used as 
a tool to learn about optimal behavior and Nash 
equilibria in a sequential voting model.11 In this 
paper we assume instead that voters’ preferences 
are not manipulable. 
When the number of candidates is two, 
simple plurality rule does not present any 
inconsistency and is the most used method. 
However, when it is extended to more than two 
candidates several controversies arise. Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem12 highlights the problem 
and roughly states that virtually all voting 
schemes on three or more choices must be 
manipulable.13 For instance, consider a case 
represented in Table 1, in which 55 voters must 
choose among five candidates: {a, b, c, d, e}. 
 
 
Table 1. A case in which 55 voters must choose among five 
candidates {a, b, c, d, e} according to their preferences. 
 
Using plurality rule a is the winner since 
she was voted first 18 times, while b, c, d, and e 
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were voted 12, 10, 9, and 6 times, respectively. 
However, a was voted last 37 times. Borda 
count, which was introduced in 1770 by Jean-
Charles de Borda and will be described below, 
would declare d winner. The reader is invited to 
verify that claim. 
Another social choice procedure in the 
literature is that of choosing the Condorcet 
winner. This procedure is currently used in 
parliament elections in countries such as Nauru 
and Slovakia. We can describe it briefly as 
follows: Each voter avowals her preference 
order and x is declared Condorcet winner if, 
comparing it to another y –in the sense of who 
appears first in the order–, x is better than y. In 
our previous example, e is the Condorcet 
winner, as can be inferred from Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Pairwise comparisons to choose the Condorcet 
winner on the case in Table 1. 
 
However, there might not be a Condorcet 
winner. Consider the setting in Table 3, where 
21 voters must choose among candidates {a, b, c}. 
 
Table 3. A case in which 21 voters must choose among 
candidates {a, b, c} and there is no Condorcet winner. 
 
In this case a beats b by 14-7, b beats c by 
15-6, c beats a by 13-8. 
We commonly find ourselves in a 
situation in which there is no Condorcet 
winner. This is called a Condorcet Paradox.2,4 In 
the simulations we describe in Section 4 it can 
be appreciated that as the number n of voters 
increases, the probability of there being no 
Condorcet winner tends to a particular value. 
Combinatorial and probabilistic methods have 
been previously used to address Condorcet 
paradoxes;14 the frequencies of undesirable 
events in electoral processes, particularly 
preference cycles have also been studied from a 
computational perspective.15  
Our aim is to examine the performance of 
the methods themselves to address a specific 
choice problem; to achieve this aim we will use 
the criteria outlined in Section 3. Setting aside 
procedural assessments of axiomatization, 
such as the property of fairness, we claim that 
computational simulations can provide empirical 
data on several questions concerning how likely 
is it that a method yields a successful outcome, 
that is, how likely is it that a method chooses the 
best candidate. There has been previous work 
on simulation to compare plurality, Borda, and 
Condorcet methods, using frequential data to 
compare their performance.16,17 We contribute 
to this discussion by analyzing additional 
voting methods and providing a rationale for 
their general assessment, which is illustrated 
with a collective decision-making problem that 
has not received much theoretical attention. 
 
2.1 A collective decision problem and 
notation 
Consider the problem of assigning k positions 
to k candidates. Each position must be occupied 
by one and only one candidate. Besides, assume 
that the assignment is determined by means of 
a voting procedure with n voters. We are 
interested in displaying electoral mechanisms –
counting and voting processes– that solve the 
assignment problem. For practical reasons, we 
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will restrict our attention to k = 3, though we 
hope that the proposal we outline can be 
naturally extended in future research. Various 
selection mechanisms can be found in the 
literature on social choice; but when 𝑘 ≥ 3, 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that no 
voting system can produce group decisions 
from individual preferences while also satisfying 
some additional criteria.18(pp87-90) Some paradoxes 
with 𝑘 = 3 are discussed by Brams.19 
We will consider two variants of the 
problem: 1) one with priority of positions for 
assignment, and 2) another without priority of 
positions for assignment. As an example of the 
former, we can picture the election of president, 
vice president, and secretary when one position 
is more important than the other(s) or must 
take office beforehand. As for the latter, we can 
think about the assignment of positions to 
players in a team sport, such as being in the far 
left, in the middle, in the far right, where it 
makes no sense to compare the relative 
importance of each position. 
In the literature on operational research 
we can find the assignment problem as one in 
which there is a performance data table among 
candidates and positions, and only one person, 
the decision-maker, looks for a solution that 
maximizes performance.20(pp435-445) However, in 
this paper we analyze preferences (probability 
distributions) among the n voters that will make 
the decision. The approach we develop in Section 4 
uses computational simulation to display 
conditions for the voters’ preference distribution 
that warrant, for each method, that the 
probability of choosing the best assignment (on 
the assumption that there is one) approaches 1. 
When investigating the frequency with 
which each method chooses the ideal assignment, 
we assume that assignment to be the one that is 
objectively correct or more accurate than the 
alternative options to be voted on. Even though 
the nature and extent of the collective decision 
problems in which there is such an assignment 
are controversial, there is broad agreement in 
acknowledging that some public problems are 
of this kind.21(pp38-47) In developing our approach to 
examine several voters’ preference distributions, 
we assume that we know what the ideal 
assignment is –actually, we fix it– and then we 
compare the performance of the methods. 
However, the ability of the methods to choose 
the ideal assignment does not require that 
someone knows which one it is, but only that 
such an assignment exists and that the voters’ 
preference distribution (even if their preferences 
are subjective) surpasses a certain competence 
threshold in identifying it. 
We will first define the notation that we 
use to describe the voting methods:  
• 𝑇 = {𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶}, the set of “candidates”. 
• A “feasible option” will be any vector 
with one or three components, each 
component will be a member of T and 
each member of T will appear at most 
once. Thus, each voter will approve or 
reject a feasible option, with the following 
interpretation: 
o (𝛼): Indicates that candidate 𝛼 
(with 𝛼 ∈ 𝑇) is being chosen for 
the first position. 
o (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾): Indicates that 
candidates 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 (members of 𝑇) 
are being chosen for positions 1, 
2, and 3, respectively. 
• A “conditioned feasible option” will be 
any vector with three components, one 
of which will be a member of ?̂? =
{?̂?, ?̂?, ?̂?}, the two remaining components 
will be different members of T and each 
member of T will appear at most once. 
Thus, each voter will approve or reject a 
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conditioned feasible option, with the 
following interpretation: 
o (?̂?, 𝛽, 𝛾): Indicates that candidate 
𝛼 (with 𝛼 ∈ 𝑇\{𝛽, 𝛾}) has been 
fixed in position 1, and 𝛽 and 𝛾 
are being chosen for positions 2 
and 3, respectively. 
o (𝛽, ?̂?, 𝛾): Indicates that candidate 
𝛼 (with 𝛼 ∈ 𝑇\{𝛽, 𝛾}) has been 
fixed in position 2, and 𝛽 and 𝛾 
are being chosen for positions 1 
and 3, respectively. 
o (𝛽, 𝛾, ?̂?): Indicates that candidate 
𝛼 (with 𝛼 ∈ 𝑇\{𝛽, 𝛾}) has been 
fixed in position 3, and 𝛽 and 𝛾 
are being chosen for positions 1 
and 2, respectively. 
• For each feasible option and each 
conditioned feasible option (“one or three 
components”) we will denote the total 
numbers of approving voters with #(“one 
or three components”). 
• The following conditions must be 
verified by feasible options and 
conditioned feasible options: 
o #(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶) + #(𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵) +
#(𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴) + #(𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶) +
#(𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵) + #(𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴) = 𝑛; the 
total votes are distributed 
among the 6 possible ways of 
choosing candidates for the 
positions. 
o   #(𝐴) + #(𝐵) + #(𝐶) = 𝑛; the 
total of votes for the first 
position must be equal to the 
total of voters. 
o #(?̂?, 𝐵, 𝐶) + #(?̂?, 𝐶, 𝐵) =
#(𝐵, ?̂?, 𝐶) + #(𝐶, ?̂?, 𝐵) =
#(𝐵, 𝐶, ?̂?) + #(𝐶, 𝐵, ?̂?) =
#(?̂?, 𝐴, 𝐶) + #(?̂?, 𝐶, 𝐴) =
#(𝐴, ?̂?, 𝐶) + #(𝐶, ?̂?, 𝐴) =
#(𝐴, 𝐶, ?̂?) + #(𝐶, 𝐴, ?̂?) =
#(?̂?, 𝐴, 𝐵) + #(?̂?, 𝐵, 𝐴) =
#(𝐴, ?̂?, 𝐵) + #(𝐵, ?̂?, 𝐴) =
#(𝐴, 𝐵, ?̂?) + #(𝐵, 𝐴, ?̂?) = 𝑛 ; 
once a candidate is fixed in a 
position, the votes are 
distributed in the only two 
possible options to occupy the 
remaining positions. 
• A winning assignment will be 
represented in the form [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] and it 
will indicate that 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 were assigned 
to positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
We can now describe the selection mechanisms 
(voting methods) on which the computational 
simulations are based.  
 
2.2 Voting methods for a problem 
involving priority on positions 
(I) Plurality rule on a single candidate with 
priority. [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is the winning 
assignment if and only if #(𝛼) > #(𝛽) >
#(𝛾). In this case, the positions are being 
assigned based on which candidate has a 
greater number of votes. 
(II) Plurality rule with runoff with priority. Let 
𝛼 ∈ 𝑇 be such that #(𝛼) > #(𝛽) and 
#(𝛼) > #(𝛾).  Let 𝛽 be such that 
#(?̂?, 𝛽, 𝛾) > #(?̂?, 𝛾, 𝛽). Then [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is 
the winning assignment. In the first part 
of this process, the voter is asked to 
choose a candidate for the first position. 
The candidate with the greater number of 
votes takes the first position. In the 
second stage (runoff), the occupant of the 
second position is chosen among the two 
remaining candidates that were not 
winners on the first stage. 
(III) Plurality rule on a full ticket. In this process, 
each voter is asked to choose one of the six 
possible full tickets (as it turns out, for 
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this method it is not significant whether 
there is a priority or not on the positions): 
If   (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)  ∈  𝑆3  =  {(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵), 
(𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶), (𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴), (𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵), (𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴)} 
and  #(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) > #(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) for every 
(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑆3\{(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)}, then [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is 
the winning assignment. This method 
picks up the most voted ticket. 
(IV) Borda count with priority. The six possible 
full tickets are identified, and the voter is 
asked to choose among them. For each 
candidate, a Borda count (#𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎) is 
performed, as follows: 
#𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝐴) = 2(#(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶)
+ #(𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵)) + #(𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶)
+ #(𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵) 
#𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝐵) = 2(#(𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶)
+ #(𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴)) + #(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶)
+ #(𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴) 
#𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝐶) = 2(#(𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵)
+ #(𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴)) + #(𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵)
+ #(𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴) 
If #𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝛼) > #𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝛽) > #𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎(𝛾), 
then [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is the winning assignment. 
 
2.3 Voting methods for a problem 
involving no priority on positions 
(V) Plurality rule with runoff without priority. 
This procedure is identical to the one 
described as (II) in Section 2.2. However, 
in order to account for changes in 
preferences after the first stage of 
election, considering there was no 
priority, the preference distribution was 
changed to “preserve initial positions 
choice” instead of “preserve ordering”. 
(VI) Plurality rule on a full ticket. This 
procedure is identical to the one 
described as (III) in Section 2.2. No 
changes in the preference distribution 
were required. 
(VII) Count for conditioned feasible options. 
Each (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) ∈ 𝑆3 is assigned an integer 
𝐺(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) which is calculated as follows: 
Pα(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) =
#(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)+#(𝛼, 𝛾, 𝛽) 
Mβ(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = #(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) +
#(𝛾, 𝛽, 𝛼) 
Tγ(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = #(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) +
#(𝛽, 𝛼, 𝛾) 
G(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = 𝑃𝛼(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) +
𝑀𝛽(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) + 𝑇𝛾(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) 
𝐺(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) counts the total votes for the 
ticket with 𝛼 in first position, 𝛽 in the 
second, and 𝛾 in the third.  
If (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) ∈ 𝑆3 = {(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵), 
(𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶), (𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴), (𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵), (𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴)} and 
𝐺(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) > 𝐺(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) for all (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈
𝑆3\{(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)}, then [𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is the 
winning assignment. This method 
chooses the ticket that gets more votes on 
the feasible options along with their 
respective feasible conditioned options.  
Do any of these methods solve our assignment 
problem? Which one performs better? 
  
3 Criteria for assessment of voting 
procedures 
It is often underappreciated just how difficult it 
is to assess a voting method for a specific 
decision problem. One reason for this is that, in 
many groups, legislations are previously placed 
to determine which method to use. Some of 
these methods, such as plurality rule, are widely 
used. However, as can be seen from the 
previous section, there are several different 
procedures worthy of the name ‘plurality rule’ 
when facing a specific decision problem. 
Another reason for the suspicion that there are 
simple criteria to assess voting methods is the 
pervasive belief that there are just a few of such 
methods. In common parlance, it is standard 
practice to qualify a group decision as 
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dictatorial, elitist, or democratic. However, 
these labels usually conceal the fact that many 
genuinely different voting methods are 
gathered under those categories. Besides, there 
are many other methods that it would be 
difficult to classify among these categories. 
Actually, the number of possible decision-
making procedures is overwhelming.  
To put things in perspective, we can 
extend a technique developed by Christian List22 
to distinguish aggregative decision-making 
procedures (voting methods). First, there is an 
“agenda” that contains the issues to be voted on. 
Then, there are “inputs” of the procedure: 
voters’ attitudes towards issues on the agenda 
(for instance, their preferences, opinions, and 
so forth). Finally, there are “outputs” of the 
procedure: collective outcomes towards issues 
on the agenda. We can distinguish voting 
methods by identifying them with “aggregation 
functions”. An aggregation function takes 
values on all possible input conditions and 
assigns to each one a specific output. Two 
voting methods differ if and only if there is a set 
of data such that they assign a different output 
to the same combination of values for (at least) 
one possible input. According to this technique 
of counting, “if there are x admissible 
combinations of individual inputs and y 
admissible collective outputs, there are yx 
possible decision procedures”. 22(p272) 
Consider the decision problem detailed in 
the previous section. The agenda consists in 
assigning only one of the three candidates 
{𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶} to each of the three positions (1, 2, 3), 
leaving no vacancies. Hence, there are six 
possible options on the agenda: the running 
tickets (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵), (𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶), (𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴), 
(𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵), and (𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴). Let us assume, for 
starters, that there is only one voter. If she 
cannot abstain, then she has only six possible 
choices (votes). As a result of each vote, the 
group (from which she is the only member) can 
pick up any of the 6 tickets. If she chooses ticket 
(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), a procedure could yield her choice as 
a group decision; but there are also different 
procedures that can pick up any of the other five 
tickets instead, choosing (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵), (𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶), 
(𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴), (𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵), or (𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴) when she votes 
for (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶). The same would apply to any other 
vote introduced as an input. A complete 
specification of a procedure should indicate all 
possible outcomes for each possible input. 
Thus, for this (tiny) group there are 66 (i.e., 
46,656) voting methods. Only one of them 
always identifies the individual inputs (her vote) 
with the group outputs (the collective decision) –
thus being, at the same time, dictatorial, elitist, 
and democratic–. Many other methods could 
qualify as rigged elections, vetoes on specific 
candidates, or more bizarre electoral systems. 
The number of voting methods increases 
exponentially with an increase in the number of 
voters. For three voters, there will be 216 
possible voting inputs (combinations of all the 
six possible choices for each voter). And from 
each one of them, the group can pick up any of 
the six tickets. Thus, this group has 6216 voting 
methods. This vastly exceeds the humanly 
conceivable procedures, but it allows us to catch 
a glimpse of some of them. For example, many 
of these voting methods will be anti-dictatorial: 
that is, they will yield a collective outcome that 
is always different from the choice of one voter, 
who never gets her way. 
This should make clear that the question 
“how many different collective decision 
procedures are there?” is not an easy one. Using 
List’s technique for counting them, the answer 
depends both on the admissible combinations 
of individual inputs and on the possible 
outcomes and, hence, on the kind of decision 
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problem at hand. Even if this technique for 
counting methods seems too farfetched, we can 
expect the quantity of possible voting methods 
to be undoubtedly immense, even for very small 
groups. If we want to make a sensible choice of 
method to address a specific decision problem, 
we must narrow down the space of possibilities 
within this gigantic class. In fact, too many of 
the potential methods would be non-starters for 
most of us. For instance, what would be the 
point of having an institutionally rigged voting 
system that always selects the first (or -nth) 
option? Would it even make sense to go out on 
election day? Thus, some procedural constraints 
are often listed to limit the voting methods 
worthy of attention.2 The most interesting ones 
seem to concern ways in which the outcome may 
reflect the overall group opinion. Additionally, 
our democratic ideals seem to require the use of 
procedures that comply with certain necessary 
qualities to ensure that all voters’ inputs are 
taken fairly into account, at least to some 
extent. Along these lines, a “procedural 
assessment” of voting methods can be offered. 
But there is another way to frame the 
problem of selecting a voting method for a 
specific decision problem. We can ask: which 
methods are most likely to produce successful 
outcomes?2,4 More specifically, we can explore 
which methods are prone to produce outcomes 
that are correct, under several conditions. If 
those conditions are usually obtained, then the 
methods that produce correct outcomes –that 
“track the truth”– offer another kind of 
advantage. By basing our choice of methods on 
the answer to these questions, we are 
performing an “epistemic instrumental 
assessment” on them. This is the assessment of 
voting methods for which we wish to identify 
criteria. Our approach is thus premised on the 
idea that there is indeed a “correct” ticket for the 
assignment problem of Section 2: there is an 
ideal ordering for the group to choose. 
Following one of the major treads of epistemic 
democracy, we assume that “the existence of 
such an ordering provides a productive way to 
think about group choice problems”.1(p60) 
Epistemic democracy assumes that people are 
reliable, that is: they are mostly right, most of 
the time. This assumption has been explored 
and supported on empirical grounds.23 In 
assessing voting procedures, we frame the issue 
as a problem concerning how to best capitalize 
on people’s reliability. Here, we draw on an 
intuition from extensions of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem.21 In that sense, this paper aligns to the 
growing literature that explores the potential 
payoffs of democratic decision-making 
procedures.24,25,26,27,28 Actually, our approach via 
simulations was initially inspired by the 
“playful” and “exploratory” spirit of Kai 
Spiekermann’s and Robert Goodin’s recent 
book, which aims to “‘see what happens’ when 
we vary the many interrelated conditions that 
might affect the overall epistemic performance 
of modern democratic government”;21(pv) 
although their main focus is on a different kind 
of decision problem.21(pp33-36) 
We can now state our quest for 
assessment criteria more clearly. Which traits 
of a voting method exhibited in a simulation 
would provide (non-conclusive) evidence for 
the claim that one method “performs well” for a 
decision problem? Which features would 
support the claim that a voting method 
“performs better” than another for a decision 
problem? Having a sound answer to these 
questions would provide useful tools for 
institutional design. Especially, it would allow 
us to run some tests on voting mechanisms over 
kinds of decision problems prior to their 
implementation. Our proposal consists in 
FIN
AL
 DR
AF
T
 9 
assessing voting methods on a decision 
problem focusing on the following criteria: 
(1) Triviality validation. If all voters prefer 
the ideal outcome, then the voting 
method always yields the ideal outcome 
as a result. This ensures that the method 
can perform at its best under ideal 
conditions on the preference distribution: 
it will never yield a suboptimal outcome 
when provided with ideal inputs. 
(2) Convergence to optimum. The probability 
of the group choosing the ideal outcome 
converges to 1 as the size of the 
population increases. This is one of the 
promising ideas sparking from the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem. Some voting 
methods can produce better outcomes 
than the average voter, provided a 
competence threshold is surpassed; and 
their accuracy increases as the size of 
the voting population grows. 
(3) Fast-rate convergence. The method’s 
ability to arrive at the ideal outcome has 
a fast rate convergence to 1 (it does not 
require a very large population). This 
criterion provides a further refinement 
on Convergence to optimum. It offers a 
comparative basis to acknowledge when 
a voting method is better at capitalizing 
the initial reliability of the preference 
distribution than others. 
(4) Initial low competence. The initial 
competence of the voting population to 
ensure that their collective output 
matches the ideal outcome converging 
to 1 is less demanding than that of 
alternative voting methods. This 
criterion is also a refinement on 
Convergence to optimum. It allows to 
compare the initial threshold of 
competence required for the group to 
improve on the average voter. 
(5) Constant behavior. The probabilistic 
results of applying the same method to 
the same initial values are consistent on 
many trials. This is to ensure that the 
qualities praised by the aforementioned 
criteria are not merely random results. 
How do the voting methods we described in 
Section 2 perform according to these criteria? 
 
4 Comparing voting methods through 
simulations 
In order to illustrate these criteria of 
assessment, we ran simulations in MATLAB of 
the voting methods for the decision problem 
described in Section 2. Here is an outline of how 
our simulations worked.  
 
4.1 General settings and procedure 
Different sizes for a population can be 
specified. For each simulation, a population 
ranging from 1 to n individuals is selected. A 
random number corresponding to one of the six 
possible ticket choices is assigned to every 
individual, according to the intended 
proportions. Assuming voter competence, the 
ideal ticket is always assigned as a default to a 
greater number of individuals. If the outcome 
of the voting procedure matches the ideal ticket, 
the simulation is deemed to be successful. In 
order to assess the procedures according to 
their instrumental epistemic value, we assume 
that there is an ideal ticket. Without loss of 
generality, we always assume that (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶) is 
the ideal assignment ‒but only a percentage of 
the population knows it; alternatively, the 
general population is reliable tracking that ideal 
assignment up to a certain degree. Then, we run 
computer simulations of the voting methods. 
Each voting procedure is repeated in k 
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iterations for each population of n individuals, 
preserving the intended proportions. In our 
experiment, we always used 100 iterations of 
each procedure. The probability of choosing the 
ideal ticket for each population of n individuals 
is determined as the ratio of successful 
outcomes divided by the total number of 
iterations. A selection performance curve is 
then drawn with the ordered pairs (n, Pw), where 
n stands for the total population and Pw is the 
probability of choosing the ideal ticket.  
The programs start by selecting a 
population size and assigning an ideal 
probability distribution by means of preference 
intervals on each candidate. Aiming to assess 
(2) Convergence to optimum and (3) Fast-rate 
convergence, different population sizes were 
provided as input. Variation in preference 
intervals allows to probe conditions for the 
assessment of (4) Initial low competence. In order 
to simulate an individual, a random number 
between 0 and 1 is created by means of the 
“rand” function in MATLAB (which follows a 
uniform distribution). At this point, different 
codes are used to specify each voting method. 
The next section provides an outline of each 
program specification. Once the voting 
procedure delivers a ticket with a complete 
preference order, it is determined whether the 
preference order corresponds to the ideal ticket. 
The simulation is then repeated several times, 
in order to calculate the probability of selecting 
the ideal ticket. 
 
4.2 Specific procedure for voting 
methods 
(a)Voting methods for a problem involving 
priority on positions 
(I)  Plurality rule on a single candidate with 
priority. A preference for a ticket is 
assigned to every individual, thus 
determining on which interval of the 
preference distribution lies its value. 
These preferences are ordered from 
greater to smaller on a candidate by 
candidate comparison according to 
the number of individuals assigned to 
each preference. 
(II) Plurality rule with runoff. A 
preference for a ticket is assigned to 
every individual, thus determining on 
which interval of the preference 
distribution lies its value. The candidate 
with the greater number of individual 
votes is determined and assigned to 
the first position. After the first position 
is assigned, the second position is 
determined by identifying the candidate 
every individual ranked highest. 
(III)  Plurality rule on a full ticket. A 
preference for a ticket is assigned to 
every individual, thus determining on 
which interval of the preference 
distribution lies its value. These 
preferences are ordered from greater 
to smaller on a full ticket comparison 
according to the number of individuals 
assigned to each preference. 
(IV)  Borda count with priority. A 
preference for the first position of the 
ticket is assigned to every individual, 
thus determining on which interval of 
the preference distribution lies its value. 
A preference for the second position of 
the ticket is assigned to every individual, 
thus determining on which interval of 
the preference distribution lies its 
value (in order to avoid making the 
same choice as in the previous step, a 
proportion is followed). A Borda count is 
performed according to the positions 
chosen by every individual. 
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(b)Voting methods for a problem involving no 
priority on positions 
(V)  Plurality rule with runoff without 
priority. A preference for a ticket is 
assigned to every individual, thus 
determining on which interval of the 
preference distribution lies its value. 
The candidate with the higher number 
of votes is assigned to a (non-ranked) 
first position. After the first position is 
assigned, the second position is 
assigned in a way that best preserves 
the desired positions of the originally 
preferred ticket for each voter. 
(VI)  Plurality rule on a full ticket. This 
procedure is the same as the one 
involving priority. 
(VII) Count for conditioned feasible options. A 
preference for a ticket is assigned to 
every individual, thus determining on 
which interval of the preference 
distribution lies its value. A count of all 
the conditioned feasible options is 
performed according to the formula 
specified for this procedure, thus 
yielding a total count for each ticket.  
 
For significant comparisons, we assign the 
same initial preference values to all methods on 
each simulation scenario. For expository purposes, 
we omit the graphs showing that these methods 
comply with Triviality validation (which assigns 
probability 1 to the ideal ticket) and Constant 
behavior (which consists of performing multiple 
simulations with the same values and comparing 
their graphs). The reader can perform experiments 
of her own using our codes. 
 
4.3 Assessment of methods using 
simulation’s results 
Roughly, the results of comparing our voting 
methods under the criteria of assessment 
outlined in Section 3 are as follows. For this 
choice problem, in general, we found that 
plurality rule on a full ticket performs as well as 
the other voting methods and, specifically, it 
sometimes performs significantly better. It has 
a faster convergence to optimum rate (see 
Figures 2 and 10), that holds under different 
conditions that spoil the epistemic efficacy of 
other voting methods (see Figures 6, 7 and 8, as 
well as Figures 14, and 15). To detail our 
assessment, we begin with the decision 
problem involving positions with priority. If the 
proportion of voters preferring the ideal ticket 
(or voter competence) has only a slight 
advantage over the preference for other tickets, 
then there seems to be no significant difference 
in the performance of our four methods. The 
selection performance curve does not show a 
clear convergence to 1 for any method, even in a 
considerably large population (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. All possible tickets have a similar initial 
preference among the members of the population or, 
alternatively, the population is nearly as competent as a 
random device (e.g., a fair dice) to choose the ideal ticket. 
 
So, it seems that a homogeneous 
distribution of 1/6 probability and near values is 
below the threshold of optimal performance. 
However, if we increase the advantage of the 
ideal ticket over the alternatives, then the 
selection performance curve starts to show a 
significant increase even in small populations 
(Figures 2, 3 and 4).  
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Figure 2. The population has some preference for the ideal 
ticket over any other ticket. This also reflects some 
preference for a single candidate (A) to take the first 
position, while both B and C are tied. 
 
Figure 3. The population has a clearly higher preference 
for the ideal ticket over any other ticket. This also reflects 
a clear preference for a single candidate (A) to take the first 
position, while both B and C are tied. 
 
Figure 4. The preference ranking for each candidate mirrors 
the order of priority on positions of the ideal ticket. The 
ideal ticket is also preferred to any other ticket. 
 
In these cases, plurality rule with runoff, 
plurality rule on a full ticket and Borda count 
always exhibit convergence to 1. In contrast, 
plurality rule on a single candidate stagnates 
when the preference for the ideal ticket does not 
favor a candidate for the second position 
(Figures 2 and 3). Putting those cases aside, the 
rate of convergence to 1 seems to visibly increase 
in proportion to the initial competence of the 
voters. When the ideal ticket has a relatively high 
probability (0.3) of being chosen but another 
ticket is almost equally high (0.29), all methods 
seem to stagnate or exhibit a very low converge 
to 1 rate, even in large populations (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Although there is a slightly higher preference for 
the ideal ticket than for any other ticket on the population 
(ticket BCA is a close second), this reflects no preference for 
a single candidate to take the first position: the population 
is equally divided between A and B. 
 
If there is a tie in preference between the 
ideal candidate for the first position (highest 
rank) and the ideal candidate for the last position 
(lowest rank), even if there is a preference for the 
ideal ticket, all voting methods behave poorly 
with the exception of plurality rule on a full ticket 
(Figure 6). As a matter of fact, when any candidate 
for the first position is preferred over the ideal 
one, the only voting method that shows a selection 
performance curve converging to 1 is plurality 
rule on a full ticket, even if there is a clear 
preference for the ideal ticket (Figures 6, 7 and 8). 
 
Figure 6. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket 
than for any other ticket on the population (tickets CAB and 
CBA are tied in a not-too-close second). However, the 
preference for a single candidate to take the first position is 
higher for C than for A. 
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Figure 7. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket than for 
any other ticket on the population (tickets BAC and BCA are tied 
in a not-too-close second). However, the preference for a single 
candidate to take the first position is higher for B than for A. 
 
Figure 8. There is a higher preference for the ideal ticket than for 
any other ticket on the population (tickets BAC and CAB are not-
too-close second and third). However, the preference for a single 
candidate to take the first position is higher for B than for A. 
 
Thus, as it turns out, voting on a single 
candidate is not a very reliable procedure for 
choosing a ticket when there is priority on the 
positions to assign. Actually, it almost always 
yields worse results than the other three methods 
we examined. (This should give us pause to think 
about record charts based on the popularity of a 
single band or an artist). Plurality rule on a full 
ticket seems to score higher on all our criteria.  
For the decision problem involving positions 
without priority we compared two of the previous 
voting methods (Plurality rule with runoff and 
Plurality rule on a full ticket) to a new procedure 
(Count for conditioned feasible options). Even 
if it does not stand out as clearly as in the 
previous decision problem, Plurality rule on a 
full ticket performed better than other methods 
(Figures 10, 14, and 15). As in our previous 
problem, there seems to be no significant difference 
in the performance of these methods when there 
is a homogeneous distribution of preferences 
among all tickets: there is no convergence to 1 for 
any method, under these conditions (Figure 9).  
 
 
Figure 9. As in Figure 1, all possible tickets have a similar 
initial preference among the members of the population 
or, alternatively, the population is nearly as competent as 
a random device (e.g., a fair dice) to choose the ideal 
ticket. 
 
However, if we increase the advantage of 
the ideal ticket over all the other alternatives, 
then the selection performance curve of all 
methods starts to show a significant increase 
even in small populations (Figures 10 and 11).  
 
 
Figure 10. When the preference for the ideal ticket over 
any other ticket is barely significant, the reliability of the 
outcomes as the population grows starts to be noticeable. 
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Figure 11. With a higher preference for the ideal ticket over 
any other ticket, all voting methods display Convergence 
to optimum even in a very small population. 
 
There are differences in their performance 
when the ideal ticket, even having a higher 
probability, has one, two, or three main 
competitors (Figures 12, 13, 14 and 15). With only 
one other competing ticket on second place 
with a similar preference, all methods show a 
decrease in their convergence rate; and some 
seem to stagnate on nearly ½ (Plurality rule with 
runoff) or even underperform (Count on 
conditioned feasible options). Surprisingly, with 
more than one competitor, Plurality rule on a 
full ticket seems to thrive. On those conditions, 
the remaining methods seem to stagnate or 
even show a Convergence to 0 on their accuracy 
as the population grows. 
 
 
Figure 12. If the ideal ticket has a high probability, but there 
is another ticket with a preference nearly as high, the 
methods seem to stagnate.  
 
 
Figure 13. If the ideal ticket has a not-too-high probability, 
but there are two tickets tied in a not-too-close second 
place preference, the first method seems to stagnate, while 
the convergence rate of the other two is still significant. 
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Figure 14. If the ideal ticket has a high probability, but there 
are two tickets tied in a not-too-close second place preference 
significantly above all other tickets, the first method starts 
converging to 0, while the convergence rate of the second 
is still significant and the third seems to stagnate. 
 
 
Figure 15.  If the ideal ticket has a not-too-high probability, 
but there are three competing tickets almost tied, the first 
method seems to stagnate, the third shows convergence to 
0, and the second exhibits Convergence to optimum as well 
as a significant Fast convergence rate. 
 
Thus, when there is no priority on the 
assigned position, Plurality rule on a full ticket 
seems to be a good method when a choice must 
be made on all the tickets; choosing the candidates 
for each position on different stages according to 
Plurality rule with runoff seems to be a bad idea. 
As for the method of Count for conditioned 
feasible options there is a divided verdict. Its 
performance seems to slightly supersede that of 
Plurality rule with runoff in certain conditions 
(Figures 10, 13, and 14), while it underperforms in 
others (Figure 15).  
  
5 Concerns over societal applications 
If our discussion so far is on the right track, the 
use of simulations could improve the design of 
new institutions or reform of the existing ones. 
In order to appreciate this, it is enlightening to 
recall that there were heated disputes over the 
voting methods’ mathematical details in the 
origins of modern democracies, at the end of the 
18th century. Competing ideas were championed 
by thinkers as Jean-Charles Borda and Nicolas 
de Condorcet, sparking off the emergence of 
the field of social choice theory.4 Many of the 
problems that those thinkers wanted to address 
required savvy and technical knowledge, that 
only a few people had at the time; for other 
problems, there is still no agreed solution, but 
their approaches have inspired educated guesses 
(sometimes conflicting). However, many of 
their impressive accomplishments are now part 
of our electoral systems. In a sense, the use of 
simulations could extend the reach of this 
project, making it both more available to non-
expert users and more fruitful in its (tentative) 
results. It can also help to revise or even rule out 
choice procedures that we intuitively would be 
predisposed to accept. It is natural to place 
computer simulation near the core of what 
Rohit Parikh called “social software”: the 
development of theories on “how to construct a 
social procedure which brings about a desired 
result in an efficient and reliable way, at least 
when such a thing is possible at all”.3(p90)  
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Being little less than a full-blown 
revolution, such an extension of the original 
project is bound to raise concerns. Although we 
are cautiously optimistic about the prospects of 
using computer simulations for institutional 
design, in this section we will address some 
sources of those concerns. 
(a) It is unclear that there are real life decision 
problems and voting processes that satisfy the 
conditions specified for the simulations. In 
specifying the problem in a way that is 
amenable to computational treatment, one 
must rely on assumptions that portrait “…a 
highly construed, artificial decision problem 
that is unlikely to occur in real-life 
settings”.25(p97),28 Some of the assumptions 
embodied in the description are clearly 
unrealistic (e.g., random preferences on each 
new vote) and for some parameters (e.g., voter 
competence), there is no clear way to determine 
which range of values might provide an 
accurate description, even if there is a general 
rationale.23 As has been diagnosed for other 
results deemed important for social 
applications, from this it could be argued that 
“the computational experiment (…) offers no 
support for the social applications proposed by 
the authors”.29(p1025) Although there is a kernel of 
truth in this concern, our approach might 
withstand such setback by recognizing such 
concern as the inevitable result of using 
idealization to formally represent complex 
phenomena. This commonly occurs in 
mathematical practice, and it also has widely 
acknowledged remedies: we can explore several 
extensions and alternatives to the original 
setting. Nonetheless, when the aim is to apply 
the results outside of the Math Lab, some 
cautionary warning and a reminder of this is 
always advisable. Although we address an 
aspect of this in (e), below, it is important to 
keep in mind that our assessment criteria are 
not primarily meant to be used as a descriptive 
tool for predicting voting behavior, but rather 
as providing insights into the optimality of the 
voting methods themselves. 
(b) The procedure for assessing voting methods 
here outlined is not exhaustive. As the remarks on 
Section 3 concerning the number of voting 
methods make plain, there remains a vast 
uncharted territory of non-explored voting 
methods. In fact, when we designed our 
example, there were several brainstorming 
meetings to propose alternative voting methods 
to compete. Our proposal provides some insight 
on how well a voting method performs, 
conditional on there being “well-behaved” 
methods in our initial pool for assessment. 
Using this procedure does not warrant that the 
best method will be selected. But this should not 
overshadow some remarkable qualities of our 
criteria for assessment. First, the methodology 
we outlined does identify non-comparative 
traits of some “good” voting methods, provided 
they are considered for assessment. That task is 
performed by our criteria of Triviality validation, 
Convergence to optimum and Constant 
behavior. In addition, there are other criteria 
that allow for comparative assessment. While 
this comparison must be made considering a 
small number of methods, it could prove useful. 
Finally, although the procedure of assessment is 
contingent on conceivable voting methods, 
there is a pragmatic requirement that would 
probably discard “unimaginable” voting 
methods. In order to be incorporated in a 
democratic society, a voting method should be 
“transparent”. In this sense, its details should be 
easily explainable to the voting population; 
otherwise, the method could be construed as a 
black box that does not accurately reflect the 
views of the overall group. 
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(c) Some simulations require additional 
information than that of (initial) competence and 
aggregation function. In order to compare the 
performance of voting methods on a scale, 
sometimes additional conditions must be 
imposed on the simulations. And there might 
be a natural way to decide which of the 
alternative ways of supplying those data are 
worthy of exploring. Actually, when considering 
other methods (see Appendix) that required 
deciding how to assign preference on pairwise 
comparisons, some of the exchanges among the 
authors were less than amicable (at the end of 
the day, we all joined the playful spirit of “let’s 
run it and see what happens”). This is a 
technical concern and it is important to take 
note of it. However, insofar as the assumptions 
are made explicit –as is always required in the 
design of simulations–, one can confidently 
endorse the claim that a voting method shows 
an outstanding performance, “conditional on 
those assumptions”.  
(d) Non-democratic methods may fare better 
than democracy according to instrumental criteria for 
assessment. In describing our proposal there 
have been many praises on democracy. 
However, there is no guarantee that democratic 
voting methods will outperform non-democratic 
decision procedures for certain problems under 
certain conditions. In fact, democracy might be 
instrumentally worse than some non-democratic 
decision-making procedures. An important 
disclosure is required at this point. Although 
our examples did not consider explicitly non-
democratic alternatives, our criteria for 
assessment are not politically oriented and 
tailor-made to support democracy. As does 
other related work,30,31 we focused our 
discussion on ascertaining which (presumably) 
democratic decision-making procedures would 
perform better, under certain conditions. But 
those methods could be additionally compared 
to non-democratic alternatives; and democracy 
might not shine as bright under that light. 
However, further exploration of these issues 
falls outside the scope of our current interests. 
Besides, recalling that the logical space of non-
democratic procedures is an unimaginable 
immense territory, we remain skeptical that 
there is always an obvious winner in that 
comparison.  
(e) Simulations may obscure some 
psychologically important aspects of choice situations 
and voting processes. Different voting methods 
use different kinds of information to aggregate 
individual inputs into the collective outcome. 
That information is usually called a “ballot”. In 
our examples, it might be a preference for a 
candidate to occupy a certain position, a 
preference for a full ticket, or a grade on a pair 
of candidates. Some voting procedures involve 
several stages. In order to compare voting 
methods, our criteria required that we use the 
same information on all methods. So, we 
assumed that each voter had a preference over a 
full ticket from the start. If that information 
was not fully required on the first ballot, we 
made the simulation “ration it”, under certain 
specific patterns. This is a gross idealization. 
Real voters might not have an explicit 
preference for a full ticket unless there is a 
request for one. And even if they do have such a 
preference, it is not clear how that imposes 
additional constraints on their voting behavior. 
Besides, the quirks of human psychology –such 
as cognitive biases, strategic behavior, and 
group conformity– might introduce additional 
forces into the preference distribution once a 
voting method is established. These are all 
empirical concerns, targeted by descriptive 
research,32,33 that our methodology does not 
address by itself. But, if we keep an open mind, 
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instead of obstacles, those concerns might open 
further avenues for new enquiry. For instance, 
the provisional result of simulations –when 
conjoined with psychological experiments or 
massive amounts of data– could be useful to 
support empirical hypotheses about cognitive 
biases on several settings. 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
As we have shown, computer simulations can be 
useful to assess the performance of different 
voting methods when they are applied to 
collective decision problems. Although we were 
not arguing for the optimality of a specific 
voting method, we outlined a methodology to 
assess these and other methods under 
epistemically instrumental optimality criteria. 
We argued that this could greatly improve the 
resources and capabilities for innovation and 
reform in matters of institutional design, even 
when there is no general theoretical result to 
support the optimality of a voting method. We 
are not implying that further inquiry into voting 
procedures from a theoretical perspective should 
be discouraged. On the contrary, theoretical 
results, when they are available, provide a better 
understanding and stronger foundations to 
prefer a voting procedure over another. However, 
solving social decision problems cannot be 
delayed until the mathematical tribunal reaches 
a verdict. Besides, not only is the use of 
simulations of voting methods compatible with 
theoretical research of a more mathematical 
vein, but simulations can provide useful insights 
for exploring new theoretical avenues. In order to 
recognize this, it is not necessary to assume that 
simulations provide direct evidence for the truth 
or falsity of a result. Instead, we can appreciate 
that simulated results can offer heuristic 
guidance on which aspects of decision problems 
or voting methods may hold more promise. 
 
Appendix 
In discussing possible ways to determine the 
remaining preferences on conditioned feasible 
options we came up with the following method, 
which is inspired by the Hungarian solution to 
the assignment problem. An alternative for 
performing conditioned voting could decide 
among feasible options in a different way than 
those defined in Section 2. In order to describe 
it, we need a different kind of ballot in which 
voters must rate each candidate on a matrix. 
Thus, the entry on row i and column j of the 
matrix specifies the voter’s rating assigned to 
candidate’s j occupying position i. Consider, for 
instance, the matrix in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. An example of ratings on candidates (i) occupying 
positions (j) to solve the assignment problem. 
 
Here, a voter assigns 10 to candidate C 
occupying position 1. This resembles the classic 
assignment problem. If we solve the 
assignment problem, we would have the result 
of [𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴] as the voter’s preference. But now let 
us suppose that B is assigned “by decree” to 
occupy position 1. Then, preferences on a 
conditioned voting are expressed by the 
submatrix that results from erasing row 1 and 
column 2 on the previous matrix. Thus, we have 
the submatrix in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. The same ratings as in Table 4, conditioned on the 
assumption that B occupies position 1. 
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Applying the solution (to the 2 × 2 
assignment problem) we have C occupying 
position 3 and, therefore, [?̂?, 𝐶, 𝐴] would be the 
final assignment. 
Thus, we could describe this method as follows: 
Assignment method with conditioned voting. Each 
(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) ∈ 𝑆3 is assigned an integer 𝐻(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) 
which is calculated as follows: 
𝐻(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) = #[?̂?, 𝛽, 𝛾] +
#[𝛼, ?̂?, 𝛾]+#[𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] 
𝐻(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) is counting the total votes for 
ticket (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) plus the votes on the 
conditioned feasible options that hold the 
order prescribed by that ticket. 
If (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) ∈ 𝑆3 = {(𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), (𝐴, 𝐶, 𝐵), (𝐵, 𝐴, 𝐶) 
(𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐴), (𝐶, 𝐴, 𝐵), (𝐶, 𝐵, 𝐴)} and 𝐻(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) >
𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) for all (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑆3\{(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾)}, then 
[𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾] is the winning assignment. This 
method chooses the ticket that gets more votes 
on the feasible options along with their 
respective feasible conditioned options. 
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